In 2009, Senator Jeff Sessions asked Sonia Sotomayor to explain a remark she had made to Duke law students four years earlier that the court of appeals is where policy is made. Her answer was careful and correct. She said she had not been talking about the policy reflected in the laws Congress writes. “That’s the job of Congress to decide what the policy should be for society.” Appellate rulings carry consequences because the rule announced for one litigant binds the next one through the courthouse door. Judges say what the law means. Congress decides what it ought to be. Sonia has about as much business legislating as she has playing baseball for the Washington Nationals.
Seventeen years later, just yesterday, Justice Sotomayor accepted the Benjamin Franklin Medal from the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia and sat for an onstage conversation with retired appellate judge David Tatel. The Democrats and their willing accomplices in the drive-by media spent the weekend on her remark that she “wouldn’t be unhappy” with term limits for the justices. The passages that deserve attention came elsewhere. She said of her colleagues’ majority opinions, “They are law review articles,” and accused the justices of having “forgotten that at the center of every case is people.” On birthright citizenship, she described a Court “focused on sort of legal theory” and inattentive to what American society has come to understand.
The interview shows that Justice Sotomayor now misunderstands the job she described so well in 2009. She grades the Court’s work by a legislator’s measure: whether a ruling helps the country accomplish what she believes it should. She wants to be a policymaker, and the Constitution gave that work to someone else. Legal theory, the thing she waves away, is the only instrument a judge has for answering the question a citizen brings to court: did the government have the authority to do this to me? A justice who treats that question as an academic distraction has taken up a different line of work.
The case she chose to discuss in Philadelphia shows how far she has traveled. The conversation turned to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the 2024 decision that ended Chevron deference, the rule under which courts accepted an agency’s reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute. Sotomayor answered with a warning about artificial intelligence. Without deference, she said, different judges will give businesses different answers, and the country will lose its ability to respond to AI quickly and “with one voice.” She never mentioned the people who brought the case.
Bill Bright is a herring fisherman from Cape May, New Jersey. A federal rule required his vessel to carry an observer on certain trips, and when the government declined to supply one at its own expense, the rule required him to hire one. The agency’s own estimate put the cost at up to $710 a day, enough to reduce a vessel owner’s annual returns by up to 20%. Chief Justice John Roberts put both figures on the fourth page of his opinion. Bright put his interest in a sentence: “Nothing is more important than protecting the livelihoods of our families and crews.”
A marine biologist can explain to Bright how an observer on deck improves the government’s estimate of the herring catch, and the biologist may be right about every fish. Bright can still ask who gave the agency the authority to send him the bill. More expertise about herring cannot answer that. A forecast about artificial intelligence cannot answer it either. Somebody has to read the law Congress passed, and the need for an independent reader is greatest when the agency interpreting the statute is the same party that saves money if its interpretation prevails.
The statute gave Bright a serious argument. The Magnuson-Stevens Act expressly addresses industry payment for observers in three settings: foreign vessels, certain limited-access programs, and fisheries under the North Pacific Council. It contains no comparable provision for the Atlantic herring fleet. Congress had authorized the government to put a person aboard the boat. The dispute was whether Congress had also authorized the government to put that person on the boat owner’s payroll, and under Chevron, a court that found the text ambiguous would accept the agency’s answer even when the judge thought the fisherman had the better reading.
Loper Bright ended that practice. The Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires a judge to exercise independent judgment about what Congress authorized, while giving an expert agency’s views the respect they earn. It did not declare the observer charge unlawful. It set aside two appellate judgments and sent the cases back, and in the companion case, Relentless, Judge William Smith of Rhode Island read the statute for himself in July 2025 and upheld the rule. The fishermen won a judge, and a judge can rule against them. Justice Neil Gorsuch’s concurrence supplies a second man for Sotomayor’s missing “people,” an injured Air Force veteran named Thomas Buffington, who lost disability benefits when an appeals court deferred to the Department of Veterans Affairs under Chevron.
Sotomayor’s vote in the case has a legal pedigree, and the pedigree is the problem. She joined Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent, which argued that Congress generally expects expert agencies to resolve the ambiguities it leaves in technical statutes, subject to a reasonableness check. That presumption about what Congress wants always runs in the government’s favor. An American challenging his government should not have to overcome a thumb on the scale before a judge will tell him who has the better reading of the law. The uniformity she prizes was never on offer anyway. As Roberts observed, Chevron allowed one administration to adopt one reading of a statute and its successor to adopt another while Congress changed nothing, and a business owner can lose money from either kind of uncertainty.
The AI passage is where she crosses the line she drew for the Senate. Recognizing that a ruling on observer fees will bind the next fisherman is the judge’s ordinary work. Condemning a ruling because it slows the national response to a technology the fisheries statute never mentions is a legislator’s judgment. Suppose another justice believed that slower, more varied AI regulation would be better for the country. Nothing in Sotomayor’s account could tell him he was wrong, because her account contains no law, only a forecast. Later in the same interview, she praised disagreement among lower courts for exposing weak arguments before the Supreme Court acts, so speed and uniformity can be virtues on some days and vices on others.
Birthright citizenship shows the same habit at the constitutional scale. In Trump v. Barbara, decided June 30, six justices agreed that President Trump’s order could not stand. Five rested on the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brett Kavanaugh supplied the sixth vote on the citizenship statute alone and concluded that Congress keeps the power to enact the exceptions in dispute. Sotomayor faulted him in Philadelphia for stopping short. Both opinions gave the children before the Court the same protection. Kavanaugh’s left Americans free to elect a Congress that would change the statute for future births, while the constitutional ruling Sotomayor joined placed that choice beyond the reach of ordinary legislation.
She wanted the larger step because the country had reached a “settled expectation in our society.” When Tatel asked whether originalists should have ruled unanimously for birthright citizenship, she answered, “Should have been.” Theory, then, is binding when it favors her result and a distraction when it does not. The settled expectation is the weaker reed. Americans plainly disagree about what has been settled, which is how the order was issued by a president who had just won an election. By what authority does a justice choose which understanding binds everyone else? She offered none. Decades of practice under a statute that Congress can amend do not settle what the people may enact next, and even the opinion she signed concedes that later practice cannot override constitutional text.
The standard binds conservatives too; it has to. A rule that restrains only the other side is a preference with a robe on. On June 29th, the Court held in Trump v. Slaughter that the president may dismiss FTC commissioners, a decision Sotomayor called “legal theory on steroids.” The same day, in Trump v. Cook, it kept a Federal Reserve governor in her seat, and Roberts’s opinion, which Sotomayor joined, declined to cast doubt on one of the country’s most important financial institutions. The lineage of the national banks is an argument about constitutional authority. Fear of rattled markets is a prediction, and a conservative who will not let regulatory delay decide a fisherman’s rights should not let a selloff decide a president’s powers.
If Congress wants the nation to answer AI with one voice, Congress can supply the voice. Loper Bright leaves every express delegation intact, and any court in the country will enforce a statute that tells an agency in plain words to write AI rules. The Senate, for its part, should ask every judicial nominee, regardless of party, one question: when the law points one way, and your judgment about what would be good for the country points the other, which governs your vote? Republicans should carry the same question into next year’s debate over restructuring the Court, because a Democrat Party that expects policy from the bench will always be shopping for different judges.
Hamilton wrote that the judiciary has neither force nor will, only judgment. John Marshall acted on it in Marbury v. Madison, where he recognized William Marbury’s right to his commission and still held that his Court had no power to deliver it. That discipline can be bitter. If Congress authorized the charge, Bill Bright loses even when the judge thinks the charge unfair, and if Congress withheld the power, the government loses even when the judge thinks it’s program-wise. At the end of the day, the people at the center of every case are better served by that bargain than by any justice’s forecast. A fisherman cannot vote out a justice who weighs the national interest differently than he does. He can only hold the government to the words Congress enacted, and he needs judges who believe that is the whole job.
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Alexander Muse is a Fellow at the John Milton Freedom Foundation and publishes political analysis at amuseonx.com. Readers who identify errors are invited to contact me directly. Each op-ed is edited for grammar and clarity using AI in partnership with Grammarly. Data provided in a sponsored partnership with Polymarket.





Sotomayor along with her joined at the hip DEI placements, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, are so acumen challenged that nobody should be surprised at anything they might spew! As to the Constitution of the United States, they all would be challenged just to spell the word constitution, and they certainly have no idea what it provides. The completely scary thought being, that they have LIFETIME appointments to confound every issue upon which they would comment on.
she's digusting...stupid DEI, and evil too boot