Why the Department of Justice Must Answer to President Trump

During Pam Bondi’s Senate confirmation hearing, a curious bipartisan consensus emerged: the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, they argued, should be independent of the President—as if the DOJ were some mythical fourth branch of government, free to chart its own course, unbound by the Constitution’s framework. This position, though politically fashionable, is fundamentally misguided. It ignores the constitutional architecture that vests all executive power in the President, distorts the principles of accountability, and risks creating an unaccountable bureaucratic Leviathan. The Department of Justice and its Attorney General must remain under the President’s direction, as the Constitution and the unitary executive theory demand.

A Unified Executive

Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests executive power in a single individual—the President. This is not a negotiable clause, nor a mere suggestion. The framers, wary of the paralysis and inefficiency that plagued the Articles of Confederation, sought a structure where authority in the executive branch flowed directly from the President. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70, argued that energy, accountability, and decisiveness in governance required a unitary executive, unencumbered by fragmented control. The DOJ, as a component of the executive branch, falls squarely under this principle.

To suggest otherwise is to reject not only Hamilton’s logic but the Constitution’s text. The Attorney General is not a judicial officer; they are a presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate, and tasked with executing the law as part of the executive branch. Independence from the President in this role would create a constitutional absurdity—an executive officer unmoored from the very authority that legitimizes their office.

Danger of Bureaucratic Autonomy

The notion of an "independent" DOJ is often couched in lofty rhetoric about impartial justice. In reality, it undermines the very accountability that ensures good governance. The President is elected by the people and answers to them directly. The Attorney General, by contrast, is neither elected nor subject to the same public scrutiny. If the DOJ were truly independent, it would answer to no one but itself—a dangerous concentration of power.

Consider this: an autonomous DOJ could pursue policies or investigations that contradict the President’s mandate, creating a schism within the executive branch. Worse, it risks turning justice into a political weapon wielded by entrenched bureaucrats rather than a tool of the people’s will. Without presidential oversight, the DOJ could devolve into an unelected, self-perpetuating institution—a fourth branch of government in all but name.

The Evolution of DOJ Independence

For much of American history, the DOJ’s subordination to the President was unquestioned. Presidents from Thomas Jefferson to Ronald Reagan operated under the assumption that the Attorney General served as their legal adviser and enforcer of executive policy. The idea of DOJ independence is a relatively recent development, driven more by political expediency than constitutional fidelity.

During the Watergate scandal, cries for DOJ independence grew louder—and understandably so. The abuses of power under Nixon left a scar on the national consciousness. But reacting to one administration’s failures by abandoning constitutional principles is hardly wise. The solution to corruption is not autonomy but accountability. As Justice Scalia warned in his lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson, the creation of "independent" executive officers risks undermining the very structure of the Constitution.

The Unitary Executive in Action

The practical implications of a unified executive branch cannot be overstated. The President is uniquely positioned to ensure that the DOJ operates within the broader framework of national policy. Whether addressing immigration enforcement, antitrust actions, or civil rights, the President’s direction provides coherence and unity. Without it, the DOJ risks pursuing priorities divorced from—or even hostile to—the administration’s elected mandate.

Imagine, for instance, a DOJ that openly defied the President’s policies on immigration enforcement, choosing instead to prioritize unrelated prosecutions. Such a scenario would not only create chaos but undermine the democratic process. The President’s authority to direct the DOJ ensures that the people’s will, expressed through elections, is faithfully executed.

Critics argue that DOJ independence safeguards impartial justice. Yet this perspective rests on a false dichotomy. Accountability to the President does not preclude impartiality; rather, it ensures that the DOJ’s actions align with the broader goals of an elected government. Autonomy, on the other hand, risks impartiality being replaced by unaccountable partisanship.

Others point to countries with independent prosecutorial bodies as models. But these comparisons often ignore the unique structure of the U.S. Constitution, which does not provide for an independent executive branch agency. Unlike parliamentary systems, where such bodies may coexist with a fragmented executive, America’s system relies on a single, unified executive to function effectively.

Conclusion

The push for an independent DOJ reflects a misunderstanding of both constitutional principles and the practical necessities of governance. The Department of Justice, like all executive branch entities, must remain under the President’s control to ensure accountability, coherence, and fidelity to the democratic process. Independence is not a safeguard against corruption; it is an invitation to unaccountable bureaucratic overreach. The Constitution demands a unitary executive, and it is time we remember why the framers placed all executive power—including the DOJ—in the hands of the President.

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